The Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade remains an enigma. Despite being falsified on numerous counts (Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas 1987, Trefler, 1995), it persists as the core theory of international trade, found both in undergraduate and graduate textbooks, not to mention in much research and policy. Clearly, while it has failed to be confirmed by the data, the notion that factor proportions motivate trade, whether at the regional or national level, continues to hold sway. This paper is an attempt at rehabilitating the factor proportions hypothesis (FPH) as a theory of interregional and international trade. Its main premise is simple, namely that the Heckscher-Ohlin Hypothesis (HOH) is one-but not the only possible-formalization of the FPH. An alternative formalization, based on a more realistic set of assumptions (endogenous technology, mobile capital and labor) is presented and is used to rationalize the paradoxical findings of HOH empirical tests. Supporting data are also provided. It concludes by examining the policy implications.
Introduction
Despite being rejected empirically, the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theory of international trade remains at the core of trade theory and, to a certain extent, trade policy, owing in large measure to its intuitive appeal. The idea that trade is based on relative factor proportions is universal, cutting across cultures, time and space. This paper is an attempt to rehabilitate the Factor Proportions Hypothesis (FPH) of international trade. However, unlike recent attempts (Trefler 1995, Trefler and Zhu 2000) , it seeks to recast the theory from first principles. The gist of our argument is simple, namely that the failure of H-O trade theory owes in large measure to a theoretical misspecification. More to the point, the 20 th century witnessed paradigm changes in economic fundamentals.
Fueling these were two developments, namely modernity (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, Helpman and Trajtenberg 1996) with the accompanying vertical and horizontal production differentiation, and secondly the development of the transnational vertically-and horizontally-integrated corporation (Hymer 1976 , Dunning 1981 ). Both we argue had far-reaching implications for the factor-proportions theory of trade. For example, the ability to innovate complete with the resulting process and product technologies would now vary across regions and countries and like other endowments would become a key determinant of trade patterns. Unfortunately, these were ignored by both Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, and later by Paul Samuelson and others.
It will be shown that when the factor-proportions theory of international trade is set in the appropriate theoretical construct (e.g. one that includes a region/country's ability/endowment to innovate and vertical specialization and the presence of multinational and multiregional value chains), then most if not all of its predictions are borne out by the data. Moreover, it is shown that by doing so, it is no longer necessary to resort to a set of unrealistic assumptions (e.g. immobility of capital and labor) to generate predictions.
Other than incorporating the idea of endogenous technological change (product and process) and the transnational firm into the corpus of H-O theory, this paper innovates in other important areas, notably in terms of the value chain per se. Traditionally, value chains are exogenously giv-en. That is, for a given product, a value chain complete with its multiple vertical links is defined.
We endogenize value chains by adding what we refer to as the visions-link which as its name indicates, consists of that stage at which the value chain for a given product is conceived of. As it precedes the value chain chronologically speaking, it is assumed to lie at the beginning (apex) of the vertical value chain. We shall refer to this as the visions-based value chain (VBVC).
Another important innovation is the concept of vertical comparative advantage (Beaudreau 2011) . Since time immemorial, the notion of horizontal comparative advantage has dominated the debate over trade. Implicitly, it has been assumed that goods are produced entirely in a given legal jurisdiction (state, country, etc) . The emergence and growth of the transnational firm has invalidated and continues to invalidate this assumption (WTO 2010) . 1 As such, regions and countries do not have a comparative advantage in the production of goods, but rather, a comparative advantage in a particular sub-process (link) or stage of production of goods. For example, resource rich regions-countries will have a vertical comparative advantage in the upstream resource links.
As our model allows for perfectly mobile capital and labor (traditional factors), the question of long-run vertical comparative advantage arises. If capital and labor are free to migrate, then factor-price equalization will remove any and all forms of comparative advantage, and ultimately end trade altogether (Mundell 1957) or so it was believed. To address this problem, two forms of comparative advantage are examined, namely structural comparative advantage and arbitrage comparative advantage. The former includes the ability to conceptualize value chains (goods and services) and natural resources, while the latter includes a capital-, labor-, or energy-based comparative advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents a brief history of the FPH, focusing on its evolution over time, especially in the 20 th century. This is followed by our model (Section II), which we refer to as the generalized factor proportions hypothesis (GFPH). Its general nature owes to the fact that technology is endogenous and, more importantly, is determined by a coun-try's endowment of visionaries and scientists. The predictions of the model are then used to "ratonalize the paradoxical findings of HOH empirical tests. In Section III, various trade indices (regional and international) are used to support the predictions of the model. Specifically, the GFPH predicts that regions and countries that are relatively well endowed with visionaries and
scientists will export what Elhanan Helpman referred to as Headquartering Activity (Helpman 1984) ; that regions and countries that are relatively well-endowed in natural resources will export upstream value added; and that states and countries that are well endowed with labor will export mid-stream value added (manufacturing activity). Section IV examines the policy implications of global value chains and vertical comparative advantage (WTO 2010) .
FPH: Literature Review
The idea behind the FPH and HOH is relatively simple, not to mention intuitive, namely that if someone has more of something relative to another thing than someone else, then should trade occur, his/her something will be traded against the other thing. It matters little what the something actually is. It could be material as it could be immaterial. Examples include: charm for sustenance, organization for security, and/or affection for wealth. In this section, we examine the FPH and HOH from a historical perspective, focusing our attention on three periods, namely the classical period (prior to HOH), the 20 th Century and the 21 st Century. Within each period, we will be interested in ascertaining both the breadth of the endowment (i.e. the basis of trade) and its relationship to trade in general. For example, is it restricted to material factor inputs (capital and labor) or does it extend beyond?
Trade is inherently based on the presence of asymmetries. This is true of all forms of trade, whether they be material in nature or not. For example, it holds in human relationships, where differences across individuals are a source of attraction and a basis for trade. Which leads us to our first observation, namely that because of its intuitive nature, the FPH is probably as old as human thought in general, and intellectual endeavors (writing) in particular. He speculates that perhaps Ohlin was referring to earlier French writers, pointing specifically to Turgot to whom the following quote is attributed:
Effectively, all one need do is to reflect upon the immense quantity of charcoal used in the reduction of metal and the equally immense quantity used in the production of iron, to convince oneself that however abundant the mineral, it cannot be brought into production unless it happens to be located near a large quantity of wood and that the wood has little value. . . . The production and sale of iron is assigned by nature to new nations, nations which possess vast untouched forests, far from all outlets, where one finds it advantageous to burn an immense quantity of wood for the sole value of the salts that one gains from washing the remaining cinders. This commerce, weak in England, still flourishing in France, much more in Germany and in the North, should, following the natural course of events, be taken up in Russia, in Siberia, and in the American colonies, until such time as they themselves become highly populated, and all nations find themselves in equilibrium, and until the increase in the price of iron is strong enough to renew interest in its production in those countries where it had been abandoned, the result of not being able to compete with the poorer nations. (Power 1987, 293) He then goes on to dispel this view, pointing out that Turgot himself was strongly influenced by the English economist Josiah Tucker. He concludes by noting that the HOH has a "far longer history that Ohlin was aware of, and it would seem most unlikely that it was first touched upon….in French works." We agree and hasten to add that the equivocal nature of its historical ante-cedents speaks in large measure to the intuitive nature of the FPH. We would go further and add that the FPH is as old as trade itself, extending back millennia to the early empires and beyond.
It is interesting to note that Eli Heckscher was first and foremost an economic historian and author of a highly regarded "history" of mercantilism. It could be argued that anyone studying the history of early empires could not but hold the FPH as the guiding principle underlying world trade.
This brings us to Eli Heckscher's seminal 1919 paper in which he presents the HOH for the first time. Specifically, he examined trade through the prism of factor proportions, focusing on three inputs, namely land, labor and capital. Technology was assumed to be symmetric, making for the situation in endowments and factor intensities determined trade flows.
Clearly, this assumption was critical. Unlike the Ricardian model where comparative advantage was based in large measure on technological asymmetries, Heckscher had leveled the playing field, so to speak. With the benefit of hindsight, this assumption seems both misguided and misplaced. After all, Heckscher was an economic historian, having written the history of British industrialization. But more importantly, Heckscher wrote at a time of massive technological change in the form of the second industrial revolution. Ironically, he was unable-or unwilling-to acknowledge a nation's endowment in science as a possible source of comparative advantage.
The second industrial revolution witnessed paradigm process and product innovations, not to mention the shift of economic, military and political power to the United States. U.S.-based multinational firms with their new process and product technologies conquered the planet, including
Sweden. Great Britain was in decline, as was most of Europe. In short, if there was one factor endowment that marked to the point of defining Heckscher's era, it was the ability to innovate in general, and the U.S.' ability to innovate in particular.
2 2 However, unlike land, labor and capital, the ability to innovate is a more difficult concept to measure. Put differently, it does not offer itself as a readily measurable metric.
One could go as far as to argue that Heckscher was in the wrong place at the wrong time. The early 20 th century was anything but a period of stable (read: unchanging) technology. In fact, it could be argued that most of the 20 th century was characterized by, to the point of being defined by, changing processes and changing products.
Not surprisingly, the HOH performed poorly, empirically speaking (Leontief 1953, Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas 1987) . After all, proprietary technological change against a backdrop of global vertical integration violated two of the model's most important assumptions, namely symmetric technology and immobile factors. In the late 1990s, an attempt was made to "salvage" the HOH by invoking country-wide technology and preference asymmetries (Trefler 1995 , Trefler and Zhu 2000 , Davis and Weinstein 2001 . Using a 1983 data set consisting of nine factors and 33 countries, he like Bowen, Leamer and Sveikauskas was unable to corroborate the HOH. In fact, he went further, pointing out the presence of "missing trade," which by definition is the absence of trade despite a non-negligible factor endowment. Also, he found that rich countries (i.e. the North)
were scarce in most factors, while poor countries were abundant. Pushing the analysis further, he invoked two possible explanations, namely higher productivity in the North and asymmetric pref-
erences. Both hypotheses were tested and confirmed by the data. Davis and Weinstein showed that when the HOH is modified to permit technical differences, a breakdown of factor price equalization, the existence of non-traded goods and costs of trade, it is consistent with the data for 10 OECD countries.
The problem with this literature, however, is its apologetic nature. In fact, the HOH as originally formulated by Heckscher and Ohlin is barely recognizable. The HOH was about trade being determined by relative factor endowments (capital and labor) in a world of symmetric technology.
In their model, trade is determined by a host of other factors, the origins of which are exogenous to the model. This is where our works enters. Namely, if (i) technology is indeed asymmetric as This paper attempts to deal with these problems, both theoretically and empirically, First, it begins with a complete or general formalization in which both material (land, labor, capital, energy) and immaterial (the propensity to innovate) factor endowments are considered at the industry level. The result ( the generalized factor proportions hypothesis -GFPH) is a more complete and far-reaching theory of international trade, one that is both intuitive and practical and one which includes Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin's version as a special case.
II-Analytical Framework
For our purposes, the "problem" of international trade will be viewed as an optimal assignment problem where the social planner maximizes social welfare by assigning the production of goods (and services) to regions or countries on the basis of "comparative advantage." In so doing, he maximizes the overall, system-wide gains from trade, thus maximizing welfare. In this paper, the social planner is replaced by individual firms that solve a similar optimal assignment problem.
Specifically, the firm will localize in geographical space, the various vertical stages (or links) of the production value added chain on the basis of comparative advantage.
Our starting point is the vision-augmented value chain (VBVC) which consists of the vision (of the product and/or process, and the n vertical stages which together comprise the relevant value chain (Beaudreau 1989 (Beaudreau , 2011 
The corresponding unit cost of Stage 2 link ij in region/country l can be formalized as Equation 3 where p  , p k , and p n are the corresponding link location-specific factor prices.
(population-level) adoptions governed by various mechanisms (selection, path dependence, learning effects etc.) occur; in the third phase, stabilization based on high-frequency adoption, happens. 4 Energy enters the analysis via resources. However, in addition to being a factor input, it is also a link (sublink) for each of the m j links. The idea here is simple. Energy rich regions/country will hold a vertical comparative advantage in the extraction/refinement of the energy in question. However, once extracted and transformed (refined/transported), it will enter each of the remaining m j links as a factor input (not an intermediate product or semi-finished good). Hence, energy sources will be a factor in structural vertical comparative advantage (e.g. Saudi Arabia); however energy products per se will constitute links/sub-links for all other activities. However, in cases where the energy in question is immobile (e.g. hydroelectricity), it stands to reason that energy can, conceptually speaking, constitute a source of a structural vertical comparative advantage. 5 K corresponds to the fixed cost of the VBVC (cost of the vision). 6 As such, the unit VBVC cost is a decreasing function of q j , the quantity of the final good/service produced. Here, the β ij 's correspond to the relevant Leontief value-chain input-output parameters. That is, to the units of link i output in the jth value chain. 
We now proceed to formalize the process of link localization-that is, the localization in geo- such a way so as to maximize overall value-chain profits. This differs somewhat from the conventional profit maximization problem in that here the firm (VBVC) chooses localizations for its links given the set of region/country factor prices, and not optimal quantities of factor inputs for each link of a given value chain. We believe that this approach describes well the potential firm's prob- 5 Here, it is assumed that all links are localized in the lth region/country. Later, we relax this assumption and allows for multi-localization value chains (i.e. more than one l). 6 Here, it is assumed that K is an up-front cost and not a residual in the Knightian sense. This assumption could be relaxed without affecting the results. In other words, factor payments to the "visionaries" could be part up-front, and part residual. Think of Steven Jobs drawing a salary from Apple as well as cashing in on higher-than-anticipated earnings via stocks or stock options. lem in a multi-region/country setting. Technology is Leontief in nature, leading firms to choose localizations (i.e. l ij 's), not relative factor input quantities (Markusen and Maskus, 1999) .
Consequently, the localization of the various Stage 2 links that comprise a given value chain will be based on the concept of relative factor abundance as measured by relative factor input prices.
8 For example, regions/countries that are labor abundant (e.g. Asia, India, Mexico)
will/should have lower-than-average wages and, as such, will/should attract investment on the part of firms wanting to localize their labor-intensive links there. The presence of trade barriers will, as such, affect the outcome, forcing firms to localize production links in a sub-optimal fashion. Tariffs on imports of natural resources, semi-finished or finished products will, in general, favor home region/country investment for obvious reasons, as will various investment incentives (subsidies, tax incentives, local-content clauses). Likewise, restrictions on natural resource exports (unprocessed) will favor home region/country investment also. That is, the representative VBVC will localize more Stage 2 links in the natural resource-abundant region.
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In the third and final stage, the market (consumers) selects from among the available VBVCs.
Successful VBVCs will cover their costs and earn non-negative profits, while unsuccessful ones will be forced out. This corresponds to the selection stage (Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Successful
VBVCs will continue into the next stage, while unsuccessful ones will be forced out of the market, at least in their current incarnation. In some cases, the failure of a specific VBVC may be met with revisions/modifications, or the VBVC may be simply dismantled and sold-off. As it turns out, this 7 In fact, it could be reasonably argued that this mimics the firms traditional problem, consisting of localizing links within a given geopolitical jurisdiction in such a way so as to minimize overall costs 8 Implicit in our analysis are the various trade theorems found in traditional models, specifically the gains from trade theorem. In our analysis, countries gain from trading value added (links) as opposed to goods/services. 9 It is important to note that the standard trade results (specialization, gains from trade) all hold in this model, but at the VBVC-link level (i.e. value added, not final goods are traded). One way to see this is to deconstruct goods into their component parts/Lancasterian characteristics. The latter are then the object of trade.
is a common occurrence. Large, multi-VBVC corporations oftentimes sell off some of their divisions (e.g. IBM selling its PC division to Le Novo, Bombardier selling its recreational products division to Bain Capital), focusing on either the most profitable ones, or ones that are related to their "core activities."
The GFPH and Vertical Comparative Advantage
This simple approach allows us to generate a number of predictions regarding regional/national vertical comparative advantage. More specifically, region/country-based vertical comparative advantage (Stages 1 and 2 combined) will be based on the relative endowments of four factor inputs, namely (i) the ability to generate VBVCs (knowledge), (ii) natural resources, (iii) capital and (iv) labor. The ability to generate VBVCs refers to a region/country's ability to literally come up with new products and processes-in short, innovate (Stage 1). This will depend on a number of factors-social, cultural, historical and economic (Lundstedt and Colagzier, 1982; Beaudreau, 1989; Griffiths and Kickul, 2008) . Implicit here is the notion that regions/countries differ in their ability to innovate.
Here, we combine Stages 1 and 2. Specifically, an additional link (i.e. the conception of the VBVC) is added to the m j Stage 2 links. By combining both the attributes of a region/country (as defined by its endowments of the five factor inputs), with the exigencies of the value chain (for all m j +1 links), we can formalize link localization in terms of a simple assignment problem. That is, assign a particular link to its most likely localization. In other words, links that are labor intensive will be localized in labor-abundant regions/countries, those that are capital intensive will be localized in capital-abundant countries, etcetera. 10 Equation 7 formalizes this process in probabilistic terms. Specifically, p ijl , the ex-ante probability that link ij will be localized in region/country l, is modeled as an increasing function of the "technological exigencies" of link ij as they relate to the factor endowment of region/country l, defined as the inner product of the various factor intensities (i.e. the αs) and the ratio of region/country l's endowment to the overall world endowment. 11 Accordingly, if α κ is high, and κ l /κ w is low, then the probability that region/country l will attract the "conception of" VBVCs link will be low. That is, the region/country in question doesn't have the wherewithal to attract "conception of" VBVC links. Alternatively, if α k is high, and k l /k w is also high, then the probability that region/country l will attract the "conception of" VBVCs link will be high. As a rule, the more a region/country is well-endowed in a factor input, the greater is the probability that it will attract a link that makes intensive use of it. 12 If region/country l is capital abundant (i.e. its relative share of the overall world capital stock is non-negligible), then it will attract capital-intensive links.
This approach to link localization and vertical comparative advantage is probabilistic in nature. That is, relative factor abundance increases the ex-ante probability that a region will attract a compatible link. As such, a capital-abundant region may or may not attract capital-intensive links;
however the presence of a low cost of capital will increase the ex-ante probability.
Equation 7 captures the essence of the generalized factor proportions hypothesis.
14 Whereas the HOH assumes that technology exists and is free, the GFPH model endogenizes it (i.e. Stage 1) and renders it proprietary (i.e. analogous to the notion of ownership advantage in the multinational firm literature- (Hymer 1976 , Dunning 1981 ). Certain regions/countries will hold a vertical comparative advantage in the "conception of" VBVCs. Consequently, they will be home to the resulting corpo- In the context (and historical context) of globally-dispersed value chains, the very meaning of horizontal comparative advantage is very much in question (Hummels, Rapoport and Yi, 1998; Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001; Reimer, 2006; Johnson, 2008; Johnson and Noguera, 2008) . It is our view that value chains have been rarely region/country specific, are rarely region/country specific and will no doubt continue to be rarely region/country specific. (Beaudreau, 2004) .
The emphasis on either defining or deriving sectoral horizontal comparative advantage at the country level, we believe, is, in large measure, to blame for the failure of comparative advantage to make important inroads in the empirical trade and policy literature (Beaudreau 2011) . The value chains and the material processes that characterize most material processes are infinitely more complex than the trivial production functions/relationships found in international trade text books.
Moreover, as pointed out, from time immemorial, value chains have been dispersed across regions/countries, making horizontal comparative advantage little more than an abstraction (Beaudreau 2011 ).
The GFPH-Based Vertical Comparative Advantage Taxonomy
Our approach easily lends itself to various taxonomies of regional/national vertical compara- Its presence will depend on a number of factors, including R&D expenditure, education, and the overall level of innovation in the region/country (Lundstedt and Colgazier, 1982; Beaudreau, 1989; Griffiths and Kickul, 2008) . Other regions/countries will have a Stage 2 vertical comparative advantage in natural resources based on their endowments. These include metallic and nonmetallic ores, various chemical elements, energy and other carbon-based products (biomass). We assume that both of these vertical comparative advantages are, in the spirit of the Heckscher-Ohlin approach, exogenous (at least in the short run) and immobile. That is, the Stage 1 capacity to gen-erate VBVCs not the VBVC itself, and natural resources will be considered immobile across localizations. 18 The former owes to the social, political, historical and economic nature of innovation (Lundstedt and Colgazier, 1982; Beaudreau, 1989; Griffiths and Kickul, 2008 To refine the analysis, we shall distinguish between two types of vertical comparative advantage, namely structural and arbitrage (see Table 1 As these factor inputs are mobile, it stands to reason that any resulting vertical comparative advantage will, owing to arbitrage activity, be eliminated over time either by an increase in the demand for the factor in question, by an outflow of the factor input to other regions/countries (as owners of the factor look for a higher return), or by a combination of these two. For example, low wages in a given region/country will prompt labor intensive firms to localize in the region/country but will prompt workers to emigrate to high-wage regions/countries (Mundell 1957 
The GFPH: The Evidence
As pointed out, one of the innovative features of the generalized factor proportions hypothesis is the unit of analysis, namely value added as opposed to goods. Not surprisingly, this will have far-reaching implications in so far as empirical work is concerned. Given the presence of global value chains (both historically and presently), it stands to reason that any and all tests using value of shipments data will be flawed and consequently of little scientific value (regardless of the findings). Ideally, value added data would be required (WTO 2010) for obvious reasons, not the least of which would be to avoid double, triple or quadruple counting. Since the dawning of modernity a century ago, there are few products that are produced entirely in a single region of country. The tendency towards the increasingly geographical fragmentation of value chains was accentuated in the 1980s by the energy crisis and the productivity slowdown. Increasingly, large multinational corporations outsourced their manufacturing operations (links in the value chain) to low-wage countries.
As value-added trade data are not available (and unlikely to be available in the near future),
we propose an alternative approach to "testing" the generalized factor proportions hypothesis presented in this paper. In a nutshell, it consists of (i) reinterpreting the results of existing tests in light of the predictions of the GFPH, and (ii) offering a series of indirect tests à la Bela Belassa of the GFPH as the basis for vertical comparative advantage and hence international trade.
Existing Empirical Results Seen Through the Prism of the GFPH
We begin by reexamining the existing evidence through the prism of the generalized factorproportions hypothesis. Operationally, this involves reinterpreting evidence in light of anecdotal and other information regarding the localization of the various links in a given value chain.
We begin with Wassily Leontief's early tests of the HOH using U.S. post-war data (Leontief 1953 ). In the 1950s, Leontief, the father of input-output analysis in the U.S., set out to test the commonly held, Heckscher-Ohlin based prediction that because the U.S. was a capital rich country, its exports would be capital intensive, while its imports would be labor intensive. Not surprisingly, this view subsumed a number of things, notably that U.S. exports and imports were entirely produced in the U.S. and its trading partners, respectively. History, however, shows this to be an erroneous assumption. By the mid 1950s, the U.S. had exhausted many of its resources (iron ore, forests, oil) and had become a net importer. Its strength lay in its ability to transform resources into U.S. VBVC-based commercially-viable goods and services. Cast in terms of value chains,
U.S. activity was increasingly concentrated in downstream Stage 2 links (manufacturing).
While a surprise-and indeed a paradox-to most, the fact that U.S. imports were found to be more capital-intensive than its exports is consistent with our model. Raw materials are highly capital intensive, while manufacturing is, on average, more labor intensive. The U.S.'s vertical comparative advantage at the time was in (i) the Stage 1-based conception of visions-based value chains, and (ii) mid-stream manufacturing. While absent from Leontief's analysis, we speculate that the R&D intensity of U.S. exports at the time, would have been significantly greater than the R&D intensity of its imports.
It is worth noting that this result is not inconsistent with the commonly-held view (at the time) that the U.S. was wealthier than its trading partners if allowance is made for direct and indirect foreign investment. As it turns out, many of the overseas companies exploiting-and exporting resources to the U.S.-were vertically-integrated U.S. multinational branch plants. G-6 countries are, in general, net importers of capital, both for intermediates and final goods, as well as net exporters of labor. According to the GFPH, this owes to high capital intensity of imported raw materials, and the high labor intensity of manufacturing activity. For example, France is a net importer of capital and a net exporter of labor, both for intermediates and final goods. That it be a net importer of capital for final goods owes to the capital intensity of fossil fuel imports (petroleum and natural gas). The latter holds true for virtually all G-6 countries. Natural resourcerich countries (Canada, Australia, and Russia) are net exporters of capital and net importers of labor in so far as intermediates are concerned. It is important to point out that most of this capital is foreign-owned, typically by large vertically and horizontally-integrated G-6-based multinational firms. Their vertical comparative advantage, it therefore follows, lies in the presence of resources (Structural Vertical Comparative Advantage). 
The GFPH and Heterogeneity
Like most scholars, trade theorists long for regularity in so far as their results are concerned.
In the 1960s and 1970s, most longed to find rich countries exporting capital and importing labor from poorer countries. Instead, they found a hodge-podge of results, some consistent with the theory, while others were abject violations-in short, heterogeneity.
While heterogeneity is anathema to HOH, it is consistent to the point of being predicted by the GFPH. Mobile labor and capital combined against a backdrop of multinational firms (global value chains) are sufficient to generate such results. For example, some multinationals might choose to exploit natural resources at the source (region/country), while others send them for processing elsewhere.
Where the GFPH generates more regularity is with regard to "structural vertical comparative advantage." Specifically, it maintains that the ability to generate VBVCs and natural resources are the two "anchors" in so far as net factor exports and imports are concerned. This owes to their immobility. While products and processes can be exported or imported, the ability to conceive them cannot. It predicts that while the traditional factor inputs will yield heterogeneous results, these will not. Regions and countries that are well endowed with visionaries will continue to be net exporters of "headquartering activity," while countries that are well endowed with resources will continue to be net exporters of resources.
Proto-Evidence of GFPH-Based International Trade
In this section, evidence of the GFPH at the regional level (within the U.S.) and at the country level is provided. To begin with, data on R&D spending and headquartering activity by U.S. state will be used to draw inferences about the ability to generate Stage 1 VBVCs. The basic idea here is that R&D and "visions" are, geographically speaking, collinear.
23 Regions within the U.S. that are R&D rich are also more likely to generate VBVCs. This will be followed by an attempt to draw inferences about country-level vertical comparative advantage from a series of Balassa-like factor intensity indices. It should be kept in mind that these findings are, at best, suggestive given the limitations of the data (value of shipments).
We begin with U.S. interstate (inter-regional) trade, the underlying idea being that value chains in the U.S. are geographically dispersed across the fifty states according to vertical comparative advantage. That is, resource-rich states will process and export resources (Stage 2), while knowledge-rich states will, on average, produce and export Stage 1 knowledge/visions (VBVCs).
Given the presence of perfect (or near perfect) labor and capital mobility within the U.S. it stands to reason that no one state will have an arbitrage vertical comparative advantage, putting the focus on structural vertical comparative advantages. 24 Two proxies are used for the presence of a knowledge-based, visions-generating structural vertical comparative advantage, namely research and development expenditure by state and, secondly, the number of Fortune 500 companies by state. Both, we argue, are proxies for the presence of a VBVC-generating culture, one that ultimately gives rise to new firms, products/services and material processes. Research and development expenditure by state is used as a proxy for the state's ability to generate VBVCs and hence have the corresponding structural vertical comparative advantage. It is important to note that this does not imply that the state in question will ultimately produce the good/service in question, but rather that the state is the "cradle" of the VBVC. Table 4 presents total R&D spending by state for 1997, gross state product (GSP), the ratio of the former to the latter, the state's share of overall R&D (Column 7), the corresponding rank (Col- if it exists at all, will lie with their natural resources. It is well known that most of these states produce and export raw materials.
It is important to keep in mind that these results are suggestive of a pattern, of a trend, and not definitive. That California has a vertical comparative advantage in the "conception of products and processes" does not preclude mining activity in the state, nor does it preclude manufacturing.
However, given that capital and labor are perfectly mobile within the U.S., one cannot infer the presence of a labor or capital-based arbitrage vertical comparative advantage. Similarly, they do not preclude the emergence of VBVCs in Colorado, Montana or Wyoming. A good example is Minnesota, a longtime resource-rich state that is also the home of 3M, a Fortune 500 company. These three factor intensities were used to construct Balassa-like indices of the relative factor content of trade. 26 Specifically, weighted (by trade flows) averages of the R&D content, the electric power-labor ratio, and the capital-labor ratio of exports and imports were calculated for 110
countries. The weights in this case were derived using United Nations export/import data by industry. The complete results are presented in Appendix 1. Consider next the four other countries, Japan, Canada, Australia and Norway. 28 The Japanese results are similar to those of the U.S.: a net exporter of R&D and labor and a net importer of capital and energy (resource). Interestingly, it exports more R&D and imports more capital and energy than the U.S., a fact that can be attributed to the more homogeneous structure of its economy-that is, not having raw materials, its activities are concentrated in manufacturing. The U.S.
and Japanese cases contrast with the latter three cases where each country is a net importer of 27 That the U.S. both export and import finished goods can be rationalized in terms of the heterogeneous nature of the VBVCs across countries (i.e. differentiated products). 28 Condensed results for 110 countries are presented in the Appendix where the ratio of R&D exports to imports, the ratio of k/n exports to imports and the ratio of e/n exports to imports are presented. We see, for example, that the U.S. R&D exports to imports ratio is 1.3676 (2.79/2.04 from Table 4 ). 
The GFPH and Trade Policy
The Ohlin-Samuelson formalization of the HOH suffers from a number of shortcomings not the least of which is the dearth of policy recommendations. While it offers a convenient framework to study price distortions (tariffs, subsidies) and other market-based distortions (quotas), it offers little in the way of pro-active policy measures-that is, measures designed to alter fundamentals. In its 2x2x2 version, a country wanting to export more capital-intensive goods (typically referred to as manufactures) has to increase savings with the hope of increasing the rate of capital formation. As technology is free, investment in R&D is irrelevant.
In short, it leaves much to desire, especially in this, the age of R&D, innovation, Michael Porter's diamond, etc. Enter our formalization of the FPH. It is our view that the Generalized FPH model of trade presented here goes a long way to address the shortcomings of the traditional approach, especially with regard to technology, resources, value chains, and knowledge creation in general. Specifically, it is able to rationalize Michael Porter's diamond approach to the competitive advantage of nations in factor-proportions terms. Specifically, by fostering knowledge creation, a country can increase its advantage in the conception of products and processes (and the corresponding value chains).
In this section, we examine the policy implications of the GFPH as presented above. Unlike the HOH, the GFPH has important policy implications. Moreover, as it turns out, most of these are concordant with the policy measures that have been adopted in Western industrialized nations over the course of the past three decades, a finding that further corroborates the GFPH empirically. As argued, GFPH-based vertical comparative advantage can be either structural or arbitrage in nature.
In the case of the former, vertical comparative advantage is based on knowledge and/or resources, while in the latter, it is based on labor or capital. (Lundstedt and Colgazier, 1982; Griffiths and Kickul, 2008) . For example, how a society responds to novelty, to change, to new ideas, to new ways of seeing things, are good predictors of its propensity to create knowledge. "Closed" societies are less likely to innovate and, as such, are less likely to generate knowledge-based vertical comparative advantages (Beaudreau, 1989) .
As cultural values are difficult to define and measure systematically, proxies are oftentimes used. For example, per-capita expenditure on education can be used as a proxy. Societies that invest heavily in education value knowledge more than those that do not. Another possible proxy would be a measure of religious and/or political freedom, the argument being that societies (re-30 Perhaps the best examples are the U.S., Japan and Germany, all of which went from industrial laggards to leaders as a result of government policy. given the mobility of capital and labor, be ephemeral-here today, gone tomorrow. Tax holidays will attract capital; however, it is not clear that the resulting advantage will be permanent, unless of course it can generate some form of localization-specific knowledge which, over the long run, would give rise to a structural vertical comparative advantage. Likewise, immigration and/or high birth rates may result in an arbitrage vertical comparative advantage; however, labor market conditions abroad may evolve in such a way so as to eliminate it. Of the policy tools enumerated in Table 7 , education and R&D are by far the most utilized.
Whereas prior to the 1980's government policy focused on stabilization (Keynesian), since, governments have sought to foster the creation of knowledge with two goals in mind, namely increasing overall growth and generating comparative advantage (OECD 2007). As growth is assumed to be increasing in exports, it stands to reason that countries will want to invest massively in knowledge.
Which is precisely what we observe. Governments, ranging from federal to state to municipal have, over the course of the past two decades, adopted policies aimed at generating structural vertical comparative advantages for their city/state/country.
Another important policy implication of our analysis pertains to welfare analysis. In the majority of cases, government-sponsored investment in education and R&D is motivated by a number of considerations, the most important of which is job and wealth creation. For example, the government of Brazil has invested heavily in its aeronautics industry by way of subsidies, loans and tax breaks for Embraer, its premier multinational. However, given the spatially diffuse nature of value chains (i.e. global value chains), it is by no means clear that the creation of a structural vertical comparative advantage will confer wealth upon the region/country. As we have shown,
Stage 1 and Stage 2 in our model are completely independent. Regions/countries that develop VBVCs are not necessarily those that will produce the corresponding goods and services. According to John D. Pepper, former chairman of the board of Proctor and Gamble:
I will start by discussing the importance of global innovation leadership. In our businesses, innovation leadership, not just in the U.S. but globally, is vital to building market leadership and a strong economic position here in the United States. Why? There are two reasons. First, there are major scale advantages that come from being global. We're able to purchase raw and packaging materials from the best and most capable global suppliers. This not only lowers costs but permits suppliers to invest in their own discovery research that can lead to stronger product innovation. Probably even more importantly, global R&D capability gives us access to leading-edge scientific developments, technologies, and new ideas, wherever they exist. Our competitors scour the world for the best ideas. We must do the same; indeed we must be ahead of them. Otherwise, we will lose our leadership position, not only abroad, but also here in America. This I think we'd all agree is not debatable. (Pepper, 1999, 1) 
Summary and Conclusions
Finding the HOH version of the FPH to be theoretically and empirically incomplete, especially with regard to technology (endogenous technological change) and institutions (the presence of geographically-dispersed value chains, immobile factor inputs), this paper set out to rehabilitate the factor proportions hypothesis of trade, be it regional or international. The gist is simple and straightforward, and turns around a fundamental oversight in Eli proaches that are based on simple neoclassical production functions, this paper innovates by incorporating the concept of value chain, a key concept in this the era of globalized production, as well as the multinational firm. Altogether, this makes for a more realistic, not to mention compelling, view of interregional and international trade, one that is consilient with the related fields of business strategy, the multinational firm, and process engineering. Beaudreau (2004), 97. 
